









































































d.Transaction-Cost-Based Selection of Appropriate General
Contractor-Subcontractor Relationship Type
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Soon-seok Kwon5
Abstract: Relationships between general contractors and subcontractors are generally formed on a project-by-project basis. However,
because of the competitive nature of the construction industry, this traditional arrangement can result in adversarial relationships between
general contractors and subcontractors, which can jeopardize potential or ongoing collaborative construction plans. To avoid this problem,
close, long-term relationships between general contractors and subcontractors, as in strategic partnerships, must be established. Unfortu-
nately, forming and sustaining such relationships can be time-consuming and cost-intensive. Furthermore, this type of relationship does
not necessarily enhance cooperation or work performance. For contractors to successfully establish effective partnerships with their
subcontractors, they must select the appropriate relationship by considering the different characteristics of the subcontracted work
involved. Based on transaction cost theory, the findings of this study show that transaction costs incurred by general contractors and
subcontractors vary according to the type of relationship established. Therefore, for the purpose of comparing transaction costs incurred
in both competitive and partnership relationships, transaction-cost-based profit models for both general contractors and subcontractors are
developed, respectively, for each relationship type. As well, by applying different strategies to maximize profits in each relationship, and
by simulating the parameters affecting the nature of the subcontracted work, the conditions and relationships under which general
contractors’ profits are optimized have been determined. Finally, based on simulation, practical guidelines for choosing the most appro-
priate relationship type are proposed.
DOI: 10.1061/ASCECO.1943-7862.0000086
CE Database subject headings: Subcontracting; Costs; Theories; Profits; Construction industry.Introduction
Approximately 80–90% of construction work is performed by
subcontractors Hinze and Tracy 1994. This dependency on sub-
contractors highlights the need for general contractors to effec-
tively and efficiently manage subcontractors in various trades.
However, competitive relationships between general contractors
and subcontractors that result in adversarial and win-lose situa-
tions can hinder or even prohibit the establishment of collabora-
tive relationships. In order to overcome and avoid the problems
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firms have attempted to establish long-term interorganizational
relationships with key subcontractors through arrangements such
as strategic partnerships or strategic alliances.
Previous studies Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000; Zou and
Lim 2005; Dainty et al. 2001 have already recognized this trend
and have stressed the need for contractors to improve their rela-
tionships with subcontractors. However, these studies have also
overlooked the shortcomings of such relationships. Indeed, build-
ing a closer relationship with all subcontractors can be time-
consuming, costly, and does not necessarily ensure better work
performance. Bensaou 1999, for instance, has argued that to
achieve successful supplier-relationship management, supplier
portfolio management, which emphasizes the adoption of a rela-
tionship type based on a particular project or market condition, is
necessary alongside proper management practices. Yet, the argu-
ment for choosing appropriate relationships with subcontractors
based on project characteristics has yet to be widely researched
with regards to the construction industry.
Based on the transaction cost approach, this study attempts to
address this issue by identifying the key factors that indicate stra-
tegic partnerships with subcontractors can be applied. As well, the
particular conditions that make construction projects suitable for
strategic partnerships have been investigated, and competitive and
alternative relationships have been compared through a literature
review. Furthermore, by applying transaction cost theory Will-
iamson 1989, how transaction costs precisely influence relation-
ship type selection has been examined. Based on the research
findings, two theoretical profit models have been developed by
modifying the model by Richardson and Roumasset 1995; these











































































d.models are respectively constructed for the competitive relation-
ship and strategic partnership between general contractors and
subcontractors. Additionally, after simulating the models using
the relative values of parameters which indirectly reflect subcon-
tracted work conditions, a set of considerations for selecting ap-
propriate contractor-subcontractor relationships at the corporate
level are identified. These guidelines can potentially assist con-
struction firms in strategically and effectively managing subcon-
tractors so that project performance is enhanced.
Subcontractor-Relationship Types
Competitive Relationships
In competitive relationships, which are also referred to as dis-
tributive, win-lose, or adversarial relationships, supply-chain
members act out of self interest to acquire a larger share of a
project Trent 2005. Despite negative characteristics, competitive
relationships have been preferred in the construction industry. Be-
cause contractor-subcontractor relationships are generally formed
on a project-to-project basis, many uncertainties arise during con-
struction due to demand fluctuation, rapid changes in customer
preferences, project-specific component activities, technological
advances, and seasonality. Therefore, given these industry-
specific characteristics, competitive contractor-subcontractor rela-
tionships have been used to transfer the associated risks to other
project participants Usdiken et al. 1988.
Furthermore, competitive bidding and price comparison
strengthens competitive relationships between general contractors
and subcontractors. Although most subcontractors consider the
competitive bidding process to be fair, head-to-head competition
among potential subcontractors diminishes their bargaining power
with general contractors. Because subcontractors have the great-
est potential for cost savings, general contractors adopt the com-
petitive bidding process to maximize their own bargaining power.
However, this often results in unfair contractual conditions and
onerous practices Kumaraswamy and Matthews 2000.
Alternative Relationships
Recently, the construction industry has recognized that project
success is heavily dependent on the contractor-subcontractor re-
lationship. Consequently, the industry has come to focus on inter-
organizational coordination between general contractors and
subcontractors, and various concepts designed to improve this
relationship have emerged from the experiences of different con-
struction firms. In this section, two alternative relationships, stra-
tegic partnering and strategic partnership, will be discussed with a
particular focus on their effectiveness at the project level and
corporate level.
Strategic Partnering
In strategic partnering, subcontractors undertake more than one
construction project or several construction activities at any point
in time. Partnering was first proposed by the Latham Report
Latham 1994, which aimed to improve interactions between cli-
ents and main contractors through the formation of partnerships
and strategic alliances Dainty et al. 2001. There are many defi-
nitions of “partnering.” One of the most commonly used defini-
tions characterizes partnering as “a long-term commitment
between two or more organizations for the purpose of achieving
specific business objectives by maximizing the effectiveness of
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2000. Although research on partnering has focused mainly on
the client-main contractor relationship, it has also been argued
that partnering with key subcontractors can help improve the
main contractor-subcontractor relationship Kumaraswamy and
Matthews 2000; Dainty et al. 2001; Shimizu and Cardoso 2002;
Kim and Kim 2003. Partnering that involves a high level of
interorganizational trust and dedication to common, beneficial
goals, is an alternative strategy that firms can deploy to achieve a
competitive advantage.
Strategic Partnership
Throughout the years, business and academic journals have ar-
gued that managers need to replace arm’s length relationships
with longer-term, collaborative, and strategic partnerships with
external business partners Bensaou 1999. Strategic partnerships
are particularly effective when the parties involved are commit-
ted, willing to cooperate, and share resources in the pursuit of
common goals.
However, while strategic partnerships are often used in the
automotive industry, only a single instance in which the concept
is used by a Korean construction company was found. This com-
pany has attempted to apply strategic partnership with subcon-
tractors by benchmarking the practice in the automotive industry.
In this company, subcontractors are strategic partners involved in
the planning phases of construction, which facilitates the applica-
tion of their experience and specialized knowledge.
Furthermore, commitment to continuous subcontracted
projects enables subcontractors to gain more profits from econo-
mies of scale. For example, finishing work subcontractors who
install curtain walls can accurately estimate future demand and
thus reduce costs by purchasing materials in a more timely man-
ner. Cost reduction by subcontractors subsequently leads to a de-
crease in unit price. Also, in the context of a continuous
subcontracted project, general contractors are given the opportu-
nity to provide partnering subcontractors with training or mana-
gerial support.
Indeed, there are many common features between strategic
partnerships and strategic partnering, and with the existing prob-
lems in current subcontracting practice, both strategies are recom-
mended to improve relationships with subcontractors. As well,
both approaches ultimately highlight the need for close and long-
term relationships between contractors and subcontractors. In
more intimate contractor-subcontractor relationships, the prob-
lems found in competitive relationships, such as a lack of coordi-
nation, can be overcome, and the knowledge and experience
gained through a sustained relationship can enhance cooperation
and future collaboration. For example, in strategic partnerships,
general contractors can help develop subcontractors’ abilities by
providing training or technical and managerial support if neces-
sary. As a result, general contractors and subcontractors are able
to foster a relationship built on trust, which results in a produc-
tive, win-win relationship. As these two alternative relationship
types share similar features, to unify the terminologies, strategic
partnerships and strategic partnering will be referred to as “stra-
tegic partnerships” from now on in this paper.
Selection of an Appropriate Transaction-Cost-Based
Relationship
However, despite potential advantages, there have been practical
obstacles to adopting strategic partnerships. First, establishing a











































































d.strategic partnership is a time-consuming and expensive process.
Furthermore, there still exists doubt that strategic partnerships are
superior to traditional forms of subcontracting. For a strategic
partnership to function efficiently, continuous coordination is re-
quired, especially prior to project commencement. As well, the
training programs and financial support required to develop stra-
tegic partnerships incur additional costs for general contractors.
More important, general contractors can lose opportunities gained
through competitive subcontracting, as their strategic partners are
contracted to conduct continuous work.
For these reasons, general contractors should consider
subcontractor-relationship management which entails treating
their subcontractors differently and discarding “one-size-fits-all”
strategies for subcontractor management Dyer et al. 1998. As
well, contractors must consider the pros and cons of competitive
relationships and strategic partnerships before selecting the most
appropriate contractor-subcontractor relationship type, one that
maximizes the advantageous features of competitive or partner-
ship relationships.
Transaction Cost
Basically, general contractors’ profits are determined by the price
of contracts with subcontractors and project owners. Additionally,
management efforts to guarantee the quality of subcontracted
work and to finish the project by the completion date incur addi-
tional costs. As well, unexpected factors that arise during a
project can result in cost overruns which reduce general contrac-
tors’ profits. These variable costs are called “transaction costs.”
The term “transaction” refers to the transferring of resources such
as materials or services Kale and Arditi 2001. When transactions
occur within an organization, the transaction cost includes the
managing and monitoring of personnel, as well as the procuring
of inputs and capital equipment. On the other hand, the transac-
tion costs associated with buying goods and services from an
external provider include the costs of source selection, contract
management, performance measurement, and dispute resolution
Pint and Baldwin 1997.
Transaction Cost Economics in Construction
Subcontracting
Transaction cost economics TCE is considered to be the most
influential attempt to apply an economic theory to the structure of
Table 1. Assumptions and Variables in TCE
Factor






Variables Frequency • Frequency
services freq
Uncertainty • Occurs be
transaction.
information
Asset specificity • Investmen
However, th
investment bfirms Williamson 1989. Based on bounded rationality and op-
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 20portunism in human behavior, the transaction cost approach char-
acterizes the transactional environment according to uncertainty,
frequency of transactions, and relation-specific assets Table 1.
The TCE approach can be used to understand subcontractors’
attempts to increase their profits as well as general contractors’
strategies to reduce transaction costs and improve construction
performance.
As previously discussed, contractor-subcontractor relationship
types can be classified according to asset specificity and the con-
tinuity of relationship, as depicted in Fig. 1. Asset specificity is
commonly defined as the extent to which the investments made to
support a particular transaction have a higher value than they
would have if redeployed for any other purpose. In some cases,
general contractors guarantee their subcontractor partners con-
tinuous work and invest in a closer relationship with these sub-
contractors by providing training and even managerial support.
These kinds of investments are valuable only so long as they
maintain the partnership relationship. Therefore, the partnership
relationship is highly asset-specific.
In construction projects with high degrees of uncertainty, there
is a greater potential for subcontractors to demonstrate opportu-
nistic behavior, such as lowering the quality of the subcontracted
work by reducing resource input in order to maximize their prof-
its. However, due to the bounded rationality of general contrac-
tors, this behavior is rarely detected even though such
opportunism incurs additional costs to the subcontractor known as
shirking costs Richardson and Roumasset 1995. For example,
the cost of rework, due to low quality of subcontracted work, is a
Illustration
ity refers to the fact that people have limited memory and limited
g power. No matter how knowledgeable managers might be, they
the possible alternative courses of action.
urs when people act in a self-interested way and “with guile.” That is,
entirely honest about their intentions, or they might exploit another
antage of unforeseen circumstances.
tes whether transactions are frequent or rare. If firms use certain
, they may decide to set up an in-house operation.
f the difficulty of predicting what might occur during the course of a
ainty causes problems, in part, because of bounded rationality,
etries, and the dangers of opportunism.
ansaction-specific assets improve the efficiency of some transactions.
that has not invested may expropriate some of the value of the

























































































































































d.type of shirking cost. In a competitive relationship, general con-
tractors generally assume that subcontractors will deliver the ut-
most performance and abstain from opportunistic behavior, as
dissatisfying the general contractor could result in the loss of
future business. On the other hand, in strategic partnerships, al-
though this relationship type has various advantages, it is some-
times difficult for general contractors to forestall subcontractors’
opportunistic behavior, particularly when transaction-specific in-
vestment is involved.
However, despite this disadvantage, there are several specific
reasons why partnerships are an effective relationship type: 1
subcontractor involvement in the planning phases of construction
can reduce uncertainty during construction projects; 2 the col-
laborative nature of partnerships and the information sharing in-
volved in this relationship type complement the bounded
rationality of general contractors; and 3 in a trust-based relation-
ship, the cynicism associated with opportunistic behavior tends to
be minimized.
Nevertheless, if transaction-specific investment is involved
that supports the development of subcontractors’ skills and
knowledge, these benefits can be reversed. As mentioned in Table
1, asymmetry in transaction-specific investment can provoke non-
investing subcontractors to expropriate some value of the invest-
ment by threatening to walk away from the relationship.
Furthermore, in the construction industry, subcontractors have a
higher transferability of relation-specific assets than general con-
tractors. Thus, when a relationship ends, the subcontractors’ en-
hanced capability enables them to secure business with new
general contractors. As a result, general contractors must pay ad-
ditional costs to establish new relationships with other subcon-
tractors. The cost related to this phenomenon is known as the
“switching cost.” If subcontractors recognize that the switching
cost of the general contractor exceeds the cost incurred by their
own low performance, they can maintain this low performance
and increase their profits without worrying about general contrac-
tors “switching” Richardson and Roumasset 1995.
For this reason, general contractors generally prefer competi-
tive contractor-subcontractor relationships and hesitate to invest
in their subcontractors, as such investments increase asset speci-
ficity between relationships, which consequently causes switching
costs to be incurred. This suggests that in strategic partnerships
which involve relation-specific assets that incur switching costs to
the general contractor, general contractors must minimize subcon-
tractors’ opportunistic behavior which is motivated by switching
costs. General contractors can do this by enhancing monitoring
mechanisms.
Further, despite the evident differences between competitive
and strategic partnership relationships, construction firms find it
difficult to decide which type will be most beneficial, as the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each type vary according to spe-
cific transactional situations and conditions. It is also challenging
to measure costs associated with the different governance struc-
tures of various transactions; thus, it is hard to determine how
these costs influence the total project cost. To address this, profit
models were developed that can be used to measure, on a theo-
retical basis, the transaction costs of both the general contractor
and subcontractors in a competitive and partnership relationship,
respectively.
Model Development
When transacting with subcontractors, the main concern of con-
struction firms is to maximize their profits by reducing the total
JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENG
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this study, two profit models—the competitive model and partner-
ship model—were developed to compare the costs involved in
competitive relationships and strategic partnerships. The means
through which the general contractor’s profit is maximized with
the proper subcontractor-relationship type were determined for
various conditions. The models were constructed by adapting the
model of Richardson and Roumasset 1995 for the construction
industry.
The profit models were designed to present the general con-
tractor’s profit from only one subcontracted work with fixed
quantities of work in a project, not the total profit of the project.
In the models, the type of contract used for the work is a unit-
price contract. Although this type of contract is based on the
estimated quantities and unit prices of the various items included
in the project, to design a simplified model, it is assumed that
only one type of item is used in the work. According to the
contractor-subcontractor relationship type, the profit models have
different parameters which reflect various project and subcon-
tracted work conditions. Detailed descriptions of the models are
as follows.
Competitive Model
The general contractor’s profit function incorporates the value
that can be obtained from the subcontracted work as well as the
cost of that work. The value that the general contractor can obtain
from the work increases in proportion to the quantity of the work,
and it can be transferred as profit. Profit is reduced, of course, if
the cost increases. The cost consists of the production cost, which
is the subcontractor’s bidding price, and the transaction cost. In
the approach by Richardson and Roumasset 1995, transaction
costs include shirking cost, management cost, and coordination
cost. The overall profit function for a general contractor, then, can
be formulated as follows:
G
com = Vq − Cc,S,M,K 1
Vq = vq 2
Cc,S,M,K = cq + SP,q + Mi,q + Ka,q 3
where Vq=value from the subcontracted work; v=general
contractor’s unit value from one component; q=quantity of sub-
contracted work; Cc ,S ,M ,K=general contractor’s total cost;
c=contracting unit cost; SP ,q=shirking costs; P
=subcontractor’s performance; Mi ,q=management cost; i
=inspection level; Ka ,q=coordination cost; and a
=coordination level.
Value from the Subcontracted Work: V„q…=vq
The general contractor’s value Vq increases as the quantity of
subcontracted work increases because the average value from one
component of the work is fixed. For clarity in analysis, the quan-
tities are used to indicate only the total volume of the subcon-
tracted work.
Production Cost: cq
Although methods of paying subcontractors can vary, in the
model, contracts with subcontractors are assumed to be unit-price
contracts. The variable c represents the unit cost per one compo-
nent.











































































d.Shirking Cost: S„P ,q…= †h„1−P… ÕP‡q
The shirking cost is incurred by the general contractor as a result
of the subcontractor’s poor performance. This cost increases if the
performance level of the subcontractor decreases. The parameter
h indicates the cost incurred due to poor performance.
Management Cost: M„i ,q…=m„i0+ i…q
Management cost is required to ensure the expected performance
level. Inspection level i is the proportion of inspected work to
subcontracted work. The parameter m represents the inspection
cost for the subcontracted work. The management tasks of the
general contractor commonly include all of those performed by
the subcontractor. Accordingly, the general contractor’s manage-
ment task workload can be determined, which is in turn used to
determine management cost. To reflect this, the parameter ,
which signifies the proportion of labor to the total amount of
subcontracted work, is added. The parameter i0 represents the
minimum inspection level.
Overall Coordination Cost: K„a ,q…= „1−s…kaq
Due to the high level of uncertainty in construction projects, the
general contractor may focus on coordination with subcontrac-
tors. Coordinating subcontractors’ work is one of the most com-
plex tasks in construction. The variable a represents the
coordination level desired by the general contractor. Coordinating
with subcontractors requires that general contractors input their
resources, which include time, materials, and even labor. All of
these factors influence the general contractor’s costs. Coordina-
tion cost k is the cost required to coordinate with a certain sub-
contractor. However, the coordination cost can be reduced if the
subcontracted work is standardized, as there is less uncertainty in
standardized work than in customized work. The parameter s rep-
resents the standardization level of the subcontracted work.
Meanwhile, the subcontractor’s profit function consists of the
contracting cost in the form of the bid offered, as well as costs to
ensure the expected performance level. When the subcontractor’s
work is so poor that the general contractor demands that the per-
formed work be redone, rework cost is incurred Richardson and
Roumasset 1995. While the contracting cost is an income, the
other costs are expenses incurred in completing the work. Thus,
the subcontractor’s profit model can be formulated as follows:
s
com = c − Ca,p − Ri,Pq = cq 4
Ca,P = cfixed +

1 + a
cadded P1 − P 5
Ri,P = ri0 + i1 − PP  6
where Ca , P=subcontractor’s cost; cfixed=fixed cost; 
=proportion of labor work in the total subcontracted work;
cadded=cost of management effort; Ri , P=rework cost due to
poor performance; r=rework cost; i0=minimum inspection level;
i=inspection level; and =acceptable rate of profit for subcon-
tractors.
Subcontractor’s Cost:
C„a ,P…=cfixed+ † Õ „1+a…‡cadded†P Õ „1−P…‡
cfixed is the fixed cost of performing the subcontracted work. If the
subcontractor wants to improve work performance, additional re-
sources, such as labor, should be input. As a result, performance
is affected by the volume of additional resource input. According
1236 / JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMEN
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relationship between performance and additional resource input
can be presented as a function P=RI / RI+1, where RI
=resource input. If the cost for additional resource input is de-
fined as cadded, the additional cost to improve performance is
caddedRI, which can be converted to cadded P / 1− P using
the above function. However, the additional cost can be reduced
through coordination with the general contractor. Furthermore,
because the general contractor’s management tasks are limited to
labor on site, the amount of the additional cost can be determined
according to the parameter .
Rework Cost due to Poor Performance:
R„i ,P…=r„i0+ i…†„1−P… ÕP‡
The proportion of rework required is determined by the subcon-
tractor’s performance and the level of inspection conducted by the
general contractor. When the inspection level increases and per-
formance is relatively poor, the proportion of rework increases.
The parameter r indicates the cost related to rework.
Accordingly, the profit function in the competitive model can
be written as
G
com = v − c − h1 − P
P
 − mi0 + i − 1 − skaq 7
S
com = pc − cfixed − 1 + acadded P1 − P − ri0 + i1 − PP q
= pcq 8
Partnership Model
The structure of the partnership model is similar to that of the
competitive model. Nevertheless, the partnership model differs
from the competitive model in the setup cost for establishing the
partnership relationship and in the effectiveness of contractor-
subcontractor coordination. The partnership model setup cost is
the cost required for training, transferring technologies, and
managerial support. Setup cost, which can result in switching
cost, often prevents the general contractor from being able to
easily change subcontractors for future projects. Consequently,
the switching cost can affect the subcontractor’s behavior. Also,
of the two previous studies Kim and Kim 2003; Zou and Lim
2005 that have asserted the need for more intimate and continu-
ous relationships between contractors and subcontractors, both
illustrate that such relationships can create communicable envi-
ronments conducive to effective collaboration. However, the fac-
tors affecting the general contractor’s profit are the same as those
in the competitive model, excluding the existence of a setup cost,
which is reflected in the partnership model in the equation below.
G
part = v − c − h1 − P
P
 − mi0 + i − 1 − skaq − s1 9
where s1=setup cost.
Model Application
There are three variables in the models: P performance level of
subcontractors, a coordination level, and i inspection level.
To maximize profit, general contractors must select the appropri-
ate a and i in both the competitive and partnership models see











































































d.“Step 1” of the competitive model and “Step 2” of the partnership
model in Fig. 2. Meanwhile, the performance level is determined
by the subcontractor. In each model, subcontractor performance
level varies according to subcontractor behavior. Although the
subcontractor can determine this performance level, in the com-
petitive model, the subcontractor’s behavior is controlled by the
general contractor. So, it is assumed that the subcontractor should
select the performance level to maximize the profit of the general
contractor see Step 1 of the competitive model in Fig. 2. On the
other hand, in the partnership model, subcontractors can deter-
mine the performance level that will maximize their own profit
see Step 1 in Fig. 2. This is due to the switching costs that the
general contractor would incur.
Competitive Model Partnership Model
Step 1. Find the P, a and i necessary to




























Step 2. Determine the maximized profit function
by substituting P*, a* and i* for P, a and i .
),,(max *** iaPcomG∏
Step 1. Find the P necessary to maximize










Step 2. Substitute P** for P and determine






















Step 3. Determine the maximized profit function




(Unless otherwise indicated, the parameters are set at their typical value)
1. Shirking cost (h) and Rework cost (r)
2. Degree of standardization (s) and Proportion of labor to the subcontracted work (  )
3. Coordination cost (k) and Shirking cost (h)
),,(max),,(max ********* iaPiaP partG
com
G ∏>∏If
),,(max),,(max ********* iaPiaP partG
com
G ∏<∏
Analysis of Simulation Results
, then competitive relationship is superior
, then partnership relationship is superiorIf

Fig. 2. Model application
Table 2. Values of Parameters
Value o
Parameter Definition
h Shirking cost of the general cont
k Coordination cost
 Proportion of labor work in the total subc
s Degree of standardization
 the rate of profit by subcontrac
cadded Labor costs for controlling performance b
q Quantity
n Number of projects
v Value
c Unit cost
cfixed Fixed cost by subcontractor
r Rework cost
m Inspection cost
i0 Minimum inspection level
s1 Set-up cost investment, trainingJOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENG
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 20Based on these concepts, the detailed model solutions were
determined and can be found in the Appendix. The model solu-
tions in the Appendix are processes to maximize the profit func-
tions G
comP ,a , i and G
partP ,a , i by derivation of the functions.
Then, max G
comP ,a , i and max G
partP ,a , i are com-
pared by simulating the models for variations of the parameters
described in Table 2, and by finding the conditions under which
each relationship yields maximized profits to the general contrac-
tor.
Shirking Cost and Rework Cost
A comparison of shirking and rework costs emphasizes how cru-
cial it is that the general contractor select the most suitable
contractor-subcontractor relationship type. A high shirking cost
indicates that subcontracted work is a critical factor of profit.
However, all forms of subcontracted work in a project do not
carry equal importance. Work of longer duration, which requires
more resources, has a greater impact on profit. Thus, as the im-
portance of a work increases, the general contractor incurs addi-
tional costs due to poor subcontractor performance. Therefore,
more important subcontracted work causes higher shirking costs.
Furthermore, if performance is poor, additional costs will be
incurred to the subcontractor if it is determined by the general
contractor’s inspection that rework is required. Detecting prob-
lems during such inspections also incurs a controlling cost to the
subcontractor. Thus, by using the shirking cost and the rework
cost, the importance of subcontracted work to both general con-
tractors and subcontractors can be determined and accounted for.
Considering the simulation results shown in Fig. 3, if the re-
work cost is higher than the shirking cost, the benefits of a part-
nership relationship surpass that of a competitive relationship. In
the values of r and h on the line, the general contractor’s profits
under the two models become the same. However, whereas the
competitive relationship is superior in the area above the line, the
strategic partnership is superior in the area below the line.
This result suggests that “who” determines performance level
is closely related to subcontracting type. In the partnership model,
subcontractors can determine the performance level because

































































































d.contractor’s managerial tasks are supposed to ensure an accept-
able performance level because poor subcontractor performance
incurs additional costs.
As well, when r is high, the ramifications of poor subcontrac-
tor performance will be high; therefore, the subcontractor will
tend to restrain opportunistic behavior that could result in perfor-
mance problems. In this case, general contractors could reduce
their total cost by minimizing or preventing poor subcontractor
performance by coordinating with their subcontractor in a part-
nership relationship; thus, strategic partnerships are preferable in
cases of higher r. However, when r is low and h is high, the
general contractor cannot control the subcontractor’s poor perfor-
mance in a strategic partnership. In this case, the competitive
relationship is superior because there is no switching cost; there-
fore, the general contractor can easily change their subcontractor
when performance is unsatisfactory.
Characteristics of Subcontracted Work
and Relationship Type
When construction firms attempt to decide whether or not to es-
tablish a partnership relationship with a subcontractor, one impor-
tant factor is the type of subcontracted work. Because labor has a
significant influence on transaction cost, one criterion used to
classify subcontracted work is the proportion of labor to the total
subcontracted work. As discussed earlier, whether the subcon-
tracted work is standardized or customized also affects transaction
costs.
In order to investigate the impact of the subcontracted work’s
characteristics on relationship type selection, the model was simu-
lated for variations of  proportion of labor work in the total
subcontracted work and s degree of standardization. As shown
in Fig. 4, in the case of a low proportion of labor, the partnership
relationship is superior to the competitive relationship, regardless
of the degree of standardization. Normally, partnership requires
intensive management efforts to prevent the subcontractor’s op-
portunistic behavior. However, in the case of a low proportion of
labor, the burden of inspection is comparatively lowered. In the
same context, if the degree of standardization s is constant, the
benefits of a competitive relationship will surpass those of a part-
nership relationship as labor increases, and in turn, the general
contractor will incur higher managerial costs for the subcon-
tracted work. Thus, the more standardized the subcontracted work
is, the more profitable the competitive relationship will be.
The degree of standardization also affects the coordination
Fig. 3. Shirking cost and rework costcost. If subcontracted work is highly standardized, coordinated
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come less complex. With regards to coordinative efforts, the
simulation results show that the coordination level required to
maximize the general contractor’s profit in the partnership rela-
tionship is lower than in the competitive relationship. This indi-
cates that general contractors can reap higher profits in the
partnership relationship without having to manage high levels of
coordination. Therefore, if the coordination cost decreases with a
high degree of standardization, the influence of the coordination
cost affecting the total cost is reduced. Henceforth, if subcon-
tracted work is further standardized, the competitive relationship
is a more desirable relationship than the partnership relationship.
In addition, considering the influences of  and s on general
contractors’ profits, lower values of  and s indicate that a part-
nership relationship is favorable, whereas higher values of  and
s indicate that a competitive relationship is superior from the
perspective of general contractors’ profits.
Coordination Cost and Rework Cost
As general contractors are cost-sensitive, the coordination cost
inevitably becomes an important factor in determining relation-
ship type. The coordination cost also indicates the level of com-
plexity of the subcontracted work. Coordinating with a
subcontractor is not an easy task, especially if the subcontracted
work entails significant variations. Variations can mean changes
in design or specifications, frequent cost overruns, and even con-
flicts with other work. Coordinating subcontracted work that has
more variations will require more time and will incur higher
costs. The coordination cost affects the determination of perfor-
mance level, coordination level, and inspection level. The way in
which the coordination cost affects these variables can serve as a
criterion for relationship type selection.
On the other hand, the rework cost is another parameter used
in the simulations. In order to understand how the results differ
according to the rework cost of the subcontractor work, the mod-
els were simulated for variations of the value r.
Overall, the results in Fig. 5 show that the partnership relation-
ship is superior when the general contractor incurs a smaller
shirking cost h. If the shirking cost is high, the subcontractor’s
poor performance results in a substantial reduction of the general
contractor’s profit. In the partnership relationship, when subcon-
tractors attempt to maximize their own profit, they exhibit the
tendency to perform at a less than optimal level. To prevent this,
the general contractor increases the inspection level, which results
Fig. 4. Characteristics of the subcontracted workin increased management costs. Consequently, transaction costs in











































































d.the partnership relationship become higher than in a competitive
relationship. Thus, the competitive relationship is favorable when
the shirking cost is high.
However, increasing the shirking cost of subcontractors r
ensures that their opportunistic behavior can be better controlled.
This is because subcontractors are aware that poor performance
can result in a decrease of their profits. Therefore, despite the high
shirking costs general contractors might incur, the partnership re-
lationship is clearly superior to the competitive relationship in this
respect.
Conclusions
In this paper, two types of construction industry relationships be-
tween general contractors and subcontractors were discussed:
competitive relationships and strategic partnerships. Based on the
argument that construction firms should not use a one-size-fits-all
approach for subcontractor management Dyer et al. 1998, this
study attempted to determine the conditions under which each
relationship type is the most beneficial. The model of Richardson
and Roumasset 1995 was adapted to the construction industry to
develop two profit models for general contractors and subcontrac-
tors in both relationships. Then, these models were simulated for
the parameter variations that affect the conditions and character-
istics of subcontracted work, and the results were analyzed. Due
to the difficulties involved in collecting actual data on transaction
costs during construction Constantino and Pietroforte 2002, in
the examination of the relative fluctuations of transaction costs,
relative values were focused on instead of the absolute values of
the parameters. The simulation was conducted for: 1 the signifi-
cance of subcontracted work to general contractors and subcon-
tractors; 2 the characteristics of the subcontracted work; and 3
the costs affecting general contractors’ transaction costs.
Consequently, the following practical guidelines for selecting
the most appropriate relationship type were determined. First, it
was found that the partnership relationship is superior to the com-
petitive relationship only when general contractors incur a low
shirking cost due to subcontractors’ opportunistic behavior. This
opportunistic behavior results from subcontractors’ awareness that
they will be less impacted by the negative consequences of poor
performance than the general contractor. Therefore, even as the
amount of shirking cost incurred by subcontractors increases,
their opportunistic behavior can be controlled. Second, although
general contractors can reduce transaction cost by establishing a
partnership relationship for more customized work, the compara-
Fig. 5. Shirking cost and coordination cost of the general contractortive advantages of the partnership relationship decrease as the
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required to put in more effort to manage subcontracted work in a
partnership relationship than in a competitive relationship. Third,
in a partnership relationship, the higher the coordination cost, the
smaller the transaction cost incurred by the general contractor.
However, because this paper assumes hypothetical transaction-
cost-based conditions, the research results are limited in their ap-
plicability to real projects. Moreover, the assumptions are likely
to emphasize the advantages of the competitive relationship and
the disadvantages of the partnership relationship. As already
noted, it is assumed that general contractors are able to choose the
subcontractor’s performance level in a competitive relationship
but not in a partnership relationship. Considering the fact that
general contractors generally prefer competitive contractor-
subcontractor relationships, these assumptions are reasonable.
Nevertheless, this article emphasizes that construction firms de-
siring closer relationships with subcontractors must understand
the advantages and disadvantages of the different alternatives. As
well, further in-depth analysis of contractor-subcontractor trans-
actions is required to determine which relationship type is the
most beneficial for both parties.
Although this paper’s findings need to be further refined and
validated through additional industry-based research, the
transaction-cost-based profit models developed here can provide
industry practitioners and researchers with new perspectives and
valuable insights on contractor-subcontractor relationships. As
well, if applied in actual construction projects, such knowledge
could ultimately improve subcontracting practices.
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Appendix. Model Solutions
To reflect the different behaviors of the general contractor and the
subcontractor, the general contractor, according to the competitive
model, chooses the variables P, a, and i to maximize profit. How-
ever, in the partnership model, the performance level P is deter-
mined by the subcontractor, not by the general contractor.
Competitive Model
max G
com = v − c − h1 − P
P
 − mi0 + i − 1 − skaq
10
S
com = c − cfixed − 1 + acadded P1 − P − ri0 + i1 − PP q
= pcq 11
Substituting c into Eq. 10 from Eq. 11, and considering the
derivatives  /PG
com=0,  /aG
com=0, and  /iG
com=0, we
can find the P, a, and i necessary to maximize the profit of the
general contractor.














































































1 − 1 − sk1 + a2
+ 1
a = a
a = 	caddedh − ri0 + i1 −  








part = v − c − h1 − P
P
 − mi0 + i − 1 − skaq − s1
12
max S
part = c − cpart − 1 + acadded P1 − P − ri0 + i1 − PP q
= pcq 13
The subcontractor can choose the performance Level P to maxi-
mize the subcontractor’s profit. Considering the derivative
 /PS
part=0 in Eq. 13, we have
P =
1
 cadded1 + ari0 + i
1/2
+ 1
However, because the coordination level and the inspection level
can be chosen by the general contractor, we can determine the a
and i necessary to maximize the general contractor’s profit.
Substituting P for P in Eq. 12 and considering the derivatives
 /aG
part=0 and  /iG
part=0, we find the a and i as
a = h22mcadded
4r1 − s3k31/4 − 1
i = h2cadded1 − sk1/4 − i
4r2m3 0
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